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INTRODUCTION
M
ajor infrastructure projects, particularly those funded by the 
public sector, routinely make news headlines, not for being 
remarkable engineering accomplishments that will support 
and stimulate economic growth and the social integration of 
communities, but rather for being poorly managed and often over budget. 
According to the works of Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002), transport 
infrastructure projects (e.g., roads, bridges, and rail) are reported to have an 
86% probability of outrunning their set cost targets. The average sizes of these 
overruns can be as high as 45% for rail projects, 34% for bridges, and 20% for 
road projects. Furthermore, Love, Sing, Wang, Irani, and Thwala (2012) and 
Odeck (2004) found that overruns could be as high as 70% and 183% more 
than the initial estimate, respectively.
Determining the causal nature of cost overruns is arguably a complex 
and challenging exercise. However, the phenomenon is often attributed to a 
variety of sources, including scope creep and rework (Love, Edwards, & Smith, 
2005), unrealistic cost targets, and misguided trade-offs between project 
scope, time, and cost (Ahiaga-Dagbui & Smith, 2014a), a poor understand-
ing of the systemic and dynamic nature of projects (Eden, Ackermann, & 
Williams, 2005; Love, Ahiaga-Dagbui, & Irani, 2016a), unidentified or improp-
erly managed risk and uncertainty (Okmen & Öztas, 2010) and suspicions 
of foul play and corruption (Wachs, 1990). A review of the normative cost 
overrun literature reveals that a plethora of studies have been dedicated to 
understanding this problem (Hinze, Selstead, & Mahoney, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 
2008; Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, Molin, & van Wee, 2010; Durdyev, Ismail, & Bakar, 
2012; Ahiaga-Dagbui & Smith, 2014b). Most of these studies identify several 
purported causes of overruns and make recommendations for mitigating 
and containing this phenomenon. Yet, there is no evidence these works have 
been alleviating the problem or improving the reliability of cost estimates, 
despite the use of techniques such as Reference Class Forecasting (Flyvbjerg, 
2008). Needless to say, the industry has earned itself the unenviable repute 
of delivering projects late and over budget, again and again, leaving clients 
dissatisfied and the taxpayer often out of pocket.
As a result of the need to improve the performance of construction 
projects, there has been a shift away from using traditional procurement 
methods (i.e., design-bid-build) to collaborative forms of project delivery. 
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Infrastructure cost overruns receive a sig-
nificant amount of attention in the academic 
literature as well as the popular press. The 
methodological weaknesses in the domi-
nant approaches adopted to explain cost 
overrun causation on infrastructure projects 
are explored in this article. A considerable 
amount of cost overrun research is superfi-
cial, replicative, and thus has stagnated the 
development of a robust theory to mitigate 
and contain the problem. Future research 
should move from single-cause identifica-
tion and the traditional net-effect correla-
tional analysis to a search for causal recipes 
through systems thinking and retrospec-
tive sensemaking to address the high-level 
interactions between multiple factors.
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Such procurement methods have 
engendered teamwork and improved 
communication practices between 
project participants. With the sup-
port of online collaborative platforms 
for effective communication, design, 
visualization, simulation, control, and 
coordination of the entire construc-
tion process, it would normally be 
expected that projects would be better 
positioned to achieve their cost targets, 
but this does not currently seem to be 
the case.
Several underlying questions need 
to be addressed if progress toward 
reducing the incidence of cost over-
runs is to be made. For example, why 
do they still occur irrespective of the 
significant attention they receive from 
policymakers, clients, and industry 
practitioners? Why has there not been 
an improvement in the reliability of 
initial cost estimates despite advances 
in the processes of cost planning and 
the emergence of Building Informa-
tion Modeling (BIM)? Thus, despite the 
advances in technology and changes 
in the ways projects are delivered, cost 
overruns remain, and probably will 
continue to do so, unless robust theo-
retical lenses are established to better 
understand, explain, and predict their 
occurrence (Love et al., 2016a). Against 
this contextual backdrop, previous cost 
overrun research is critically reviewed 
to identify some of the embedded meth-
odological weaknesses. The article is 
structured as follows: a discussion of 
the scale and nature of the cost over-
run problem facing the construction 
industry is followed by a critique of the 
replicative, superficial, and stagnated 
nature of much of the cost overrun 
research found in the extant litera-
ture. The article specifically highlights 
the poor understanding of project 
systemicity and lack of demonstrable 
causality; a focus on independent, 
single-cause identification and tradi-
tional net-effect correlational analy-
sis; as well as a dependence on poorly 
designed survey instruments. Recom-
mendations for the future directions of 
cost overrun research and mitigation 
are then presented.
Cost Overrun: The Scale of the Problem
Cost estimates prepared in the early 
stages of a project allow a client to 
evaluate tenders, secure funding, and/
or perform a cost–benefit analysis. 
These estimates also often become the 
basis for cost control during a proj-
ect’s delivery (Ahiaga-Dagbui & Smith, 
2014a). When a project is a commercial 
asset, the initial capital investment to 
deliver it must be balanced with the 
cost of maintenance and operations 
over its lifetime to ensure it remains 
profitable, and planned returns on 
investment are achievable. Thus, deci-
sions made during the formative stages 
of a project carry far-reaching economic 
consequences and can seal its financial 
fate. Effective cost planning, therefore, 
relates design of buildings to their cost, 
potential scope changes, quality, utility, 
appearance, as well as other risks that 
might affect the delivery of the project 
on time and an agreed-on budget.
A significant number of infrastruc-
ture projects, however, routinely over-
run their cost estimates. The statistics 
on infrastructure cost overrun has been 
well-documented in the literature, 
official government publications, and 
the popular media (e.g., Love, Smith, 
Simpson, Regan, & Olatunji, 2015). For 
example, the Auditor General of Western 
Australia assessed the management and 
performance of 20 capital-intensive 
projects, including sports venues, 
schools, and hospitals. The expected 
cost of all these projects at the time was 
AU$6.157 (US$4.66) billion, a staggering 
AU$3.275 (US$2.48) billion (114%) more 
than the total original approved budget 
estimates. A total of 15 of the 20 projects 
were expected to exceed their original 
approved budgets, of which four were 
expected to exceed their budgets by 
more than 200% (Auditor General of 
Western Australia, 2012).
Alex, Al Hussein, Bouferguene, and 
Siri Fernando (2010) reported that there 
was up to a 60% discrepancy between 
actual and estimated costs of over the 
800 water and sewer projects they sam-
pled. The 2012 London Olympics bid was 
awarded at approximately US$2.92 billion 
in 2005, which was adjusted to about 
US$11.46 billion in 2007 after significant 
changes in scope. The project was even-
tually completed at US$10.97 billion in 
2010 (National Audit Office, 2012). In 
Scotland, The Edinburgh Trams project 
exceeded its initial budget leading to 
significant scope reduction to curtail the 
ever-growing cost (Miller, 2011; Railnews, 
2012). The project, was initially expected 
to cost about £375 (US$462) million, 
but was completed three years late at a 
reported £776 (US$956) million (City of 
Edinburgh Council, 2014).
The City of Boston’s Central Artery 
project (referred to as the Big Dig) was to 
cost US$2.6 billion, but was completed 
at US$14.8 billion and seven years late 
in 2006 (Gelinas, 2007). The United 
Kingdom (UK) Government commis-
sioned a report in 1998 on the con-
struction industry’s performance and it 
was revealed that over 50% of projects 
overspent their budget (Egan, 1998). A 
similar report in the United States sug-
gested that 77% of projects exceeded 
their budget, sometimes to the tune of 
over 200% (General Accounting Office, 
1997). These rather unfortunate statis-
tics have often led to extensive claims, 
disputes, and litigations, which have 
contributed to marring the construction 
industry’s reputation.
Cost Overrun Research: Superficial, 
Replicative, and Stagnated
The generic research process often 
involves an initial research design, 
data collection, its analysis, and inter-
pretation (Figure 1). Research designs, 
however, span the broad philosophical 
assumptions about the nature of knowl-
edge, to the specific methods of data col-
lection and validity of the conclusions 
reached. It is crucial that the research 
design is appropriately tailored to the 
type and nature of problem under inves-
tigation. If an unsuitable data collection 
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method or analysis is adopted, the 
results and conclusions reached can be 
misleading, thus providing no useful 
direction for understanding the phe-
nomenon under study.
Contrary to the generic research 
process outlined in Figure 1, the goal of 
most qualitative research approaches 
is to generate theory as an outcome of 
the research (advocacy research or eth-
nographies may be notable exceptions 
(Creswell, 2009). The social, economic, 
context-dependent, and organizational 
embeddedness of the cost overrun prob-
lem means that the majority of cost 
overrun research tends to be more 
qualitative in nature. Cost overruns are 
embedded in the context of people and 
organizations interacting in the complex 
web of business models, governments, 
technology, market structures, pro-
curement strategies, risks, and uncer-
tainty. It becomes difficult to isolate the 
root causes of overruns using generic 
broadcasted surveys instruments that 
are divorced from context (Love et al., 
2016a).
A faulty understanding of the sys-
temicity described above has unfortu-
nately led to poor research designs that 
are superficial and replicative, leading 
to stagnation in the incremental under-
standing of the nature and sources of 
cost overrun on construction projects. 
For example, Memon, Rahman, and 
Aziz (2012) undertook an investiga-
tion into the ’causes’ of cost overrun in 
large construction projects in Malaysia. 
Using the extant literature, they first 
identified 35 different factors that could 
lead to cost overrun and then required 
clients, consultants, and contractors to 
rank these factors on a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from ‘not significant’ to 
‘extremely significant.’ These factors 
include ‘poor project management,’ 
‘lack of coordination between parties,’ 
‘mistakes during construction,’ and 
‘slow information flow between par-
ties.’ A Relative Importance (RI) index, 
defined in equation one, was then used 
to weight these factors. The strength 
of correlation between the various 
factors was also measured using the 
Spearman’s rank correlation, r, to add 
some statistical rigor to the study.
Where
and subcontractors. They considered 
40 different factors in their study and 
requested that respondents rate the lev-
els of impact of these factors on the proj-
ect’s final cost using a five-point Likert 
scale (very low to very high impact). Just 
as in the Memon et al. (2012) study, they 
computed the RI of the factors using the 
rankings provided by the respondents 
to determine the most importance cost 
overrun influencing factors. The top five 
factors identified were: (1) “improper 
planning”; (2) “inaccurate project cost 
estimation”; (3) “high cost of needed 
resources (money, men, materials, and 
machinery)”; (4) “lack of skilled work-
force”; and (5) “price of construction 
materials and high land prices.” It is 
worth noting that cost estimation is a 
planning function, and thus “inaccurate 
project cost estimation” is a sub-factor 
of “improper planning.” Similarly, “high 
cost of needed resources” cannot really 
be separated from “price of construc-
tion materials and high land prices.”
The aforementioned approach to 
cost overrun research is not untypical—
Mansfield, Ugwu, and Doran (1994), 
Kaming et al. (1997), Ameh, Soyingbe, 
and Oudusami (2010), and Rosenfeld 
(2014) have all conducted almost iden-
tical studies, albeit in different contexts. 
A detailed examination of these studies 
reveals common pathologies, including 
a poor understanding of project system-
icity and lack of demonstrable causality; 
a focus on independent, single-cause 
identification, and traditional net-effect 
correlational analysis; the use of poorly 
designed survey instruments; and the 
use of superficial and ambiguous factors 
are discussed hereinafter.
Project Complexity and Systemicity
A poor understanding and treatment 
of project complexity and systemic-
ity (i.e., the complex, dynamic behav-
ior exhibited by systems) is the most 
common shortcoming of cost overrun 
research that has been undertaken. 
Although there is now a growing body 
of research that applies systems think-
ing to investigate cost and schedule 
Figure 1: Research process.
Theorizing Research Design Data Collection Data Analysis Data Interpretation 
w 5  weighting given to each factor by 
respondents
x 5  frequency of response given for each 
cause
A 5 highest weight (i.e., 5 in this case)
N 5 total number of participants
Out of the 150 questionnaires dis-
tributed, 103 were returned, with 97 of 
them being valid. Fluctuation in prices 
of materials, contractor cash flow prob-
lems, and client payment delay were the 
top three ‘causes’ of overrun. Respon-
dents were also required to recall the 
approximate extent of cost overrun 
(cost beyond contract sum) for the proj-
ects they were involved with within the 
past ten years. A majority (61%) of the 
respondents reported a range of 5% 
to 10% of contract sum; only approxi-
mately 20% of the respondents recalled 
overruns beyond 20% of contract sum.
Durdyev et al. (2012) also investi-
gated the factors that lead to cost over-
runs in the construction of residential 
buildings in Turkey using a question-
naire survey distributed to project 
management consultants, contractors, 
Equation 1
Relative  
Importance  
Index
∑51 w.x
A.N5
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overruns in infrastructure projects 
(Ackermann & Eden, 2005; Boateng, 
Ahiaga-Dagbui, Chen, & Agunlana, 
2015), the vast majority of studies frame 
the overrun problem in a manner that 
ignores the complex, multiple feedback, 
and highly dynamic context of projects. 
For example, a vast majority of stud-
ies identify single points in a causal 
chain in which an intervention may 
have reasonably been implemented to 
change performance and prevent an 
undesirable outcome (Love, Smith, & 
Edwards, 2016b). The identification 
of singular and independent causes, 
which in most cases only describe the 
proximal causes, is counterproductive, 
because overrun causation can only 
be understood by looking at the whole 
project system in which it occurs and 
how variables dynamically interact with 
one another. Simply identifying and list-
ing factors that may contribute to a cost 
overrun does not provide evidence of 
causation and the ability to draw con-
clusions about the underlying dynamics 
that lead to their occurrence (Love et al., 
2016b).
Statistical techniques, such as 
multiple regression analysis (MRA), 
typically aim to measure how each inde-
pendent variable contributes to explain-
ing the variation that is observed in a 
dependent variable. Such models are 
primarily intended to provide an evalu-
ation of the net-effects of independent 
over dependent variables. Ragin (2008) 
states:
“In conventional quantitative research, 
independent variables are seen as ana-
lytically separable causes of the outcomes 
under investigation. Typically, each causal 
variable is thought to have an autono-
mous or independent capacity to influ-
ence the level, intensity, or probability of 
the dependent variable.” (p. 112)
However, the focus on net-effect 
contribution of variables, assumed to 
be linear and independent, may be 
insufficient to cope with the systemicity 
in complex systems such as construc-
tion projects, as variables of causation 
tend to be interrelated and interde-
pendent as well as dynamic over the 
project’s life cycle. The approach is also 
deterministic in nature and does not 
accommodate the probabilistic nature 
of outcomes in a complex system (Love 
et al., 2016b).
Simon (1981) describes a complex 
system as one in which the behavior 
of the whole is difficult to deduce from 
understanding the individual parts. It 
follows that, although it might be easy 
to know the variables that impact a proj-
ect and its outturn, “it can be difficult 
to understand intuitively how the lat-
ter came from the former.” (Williams, 
Ackermann, Eden, & Howick, 2005, 
p. 220). This may be due to project sys-
temicity or complexity, as they can pro-
duce a totality of effect beyond the sum 
of the results that would be expected 
from individual causes. Hamilton (1997) 
outlines two important properties of sys-
tems thinking that would be useful in 
cost overrun research: (1) every part of a 
system has properties that it loses when 
separated from the system; and (2) every 
system has some essential properties 
that none of its parts do. Thus, when a 
system is taken apart, it loses its essential 
properties (Von Bertalanffy, 1956). It fol-
lows that the crucial skill in understand-
ing cost overrun is not just the ability to 
list or rank factors but the capacity to see 
connections between the various causal 
factors as well as how they dynamically 
evolve over the course of the project.
Love, Edwards, and Irani (2008) 
investigated the factors that contributed 
to the 10.5% cost overrun experienced 
on two residential projects with a con-
tract value of AU$10.96 million; they 
found that 3.15% of this overrun could 
be attributed to rework that was design 
induced and as a result of defects. 
Change orders initiated by the client 
accounted for up to 7.35% of the over-
run experienced. A further exploration 
of the causal nature of rework on the 
project revealed that it was not read-
ily easy to isolate single or indepen-
dent causes for rework. Its sources were 
interconnected in complex ways.
The use of the singular cause iden-
tification approach has led to inap-
propriate risk assessments for cost 
overrun to be developed: the interde-
pendency between causal variables has 
not been considered and accommo-
dated. Cost overruns seldom occur as 
a result of a stand-alone cause. Even 
though they may superficially appear 
to be different, sources of poor per-
formance in infrastructure projects are 
interrelated in complex ways. As sug-
gested by Rodrigues and Bowers (1996), 
traditional approaches to investigating 
project management–related problems 
usually assume that if each element of 
the project can be understood, then 
the whole system may be controlled 
and delivered effectively. Naturally this 
approach has yet to assist project man-
agers in delivering their projects to their 
pre-determined outcomes.
Project cost overrun may arise from 
a variety of different combinations of 
causal conditions—this is referred to as 
multiple conjunctural causation (Ragin, 
2004), in which many causes/variables 
combine to produce several causal reci-
pes, each of which may be sufficient 
to result in the outcome. This reso-
nates with organizational theories of 
equifinality by Von Bertalanffy (1956), 
who posits that a system can reach the 
same final state, from different initial 
conditions, and by a variety of different 
paths. To investigate this type of causa-
tion, Woodside (2013) suggests a move 
toward the examination of high-level 
interactions between multiple factors. 
It will important, therefore, to adopt 
systemic and probabilistic approaches 
when investigating complex problems 
such as cost overruns, particularly in 
large infrastructure projects.
The Use of Multiple Regression Analysis
Related to the issue of lack of systems 
thinking is the use of Multiple Regres-
sion Analysis (MRA) for establishing 
best fit relationships for predicting cost 
overrun or project success (Iyer & Jha, 
2005; Arif, Lodi, & Azhar, 2015). Multiple 
Regression Analysis is an established 
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statistical method useful for problems 
with a small number of variables, large 
amounts of reliable and valid data, and 
well-established causal relationships 
such as elasticity of income or price 
(Armstrong, 2012). However, where 
significant complexities and inter-
dependency exist between variables, 
regression models tend to return rather 
spurious results (see Armstrong, 1970; 
Woodside, 2013). For example, using 
stepwise regression, a study beginning 
with 31 observations and 30 potential 
variables included only variables with 
a t value greater than 2.0. The adjusted 
R square was 0.85 with eight significant 
predictive variables. This would seem 
to be a model with good fit on perfunc-
tory examination until it is revealed 
that the original data was from a book 
of random numbers (Armstrong, 1970). 
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2009) thus 
note that “achieving a good fit to obser-
vations does not necessarily mean we 
have found a good model, and choosing 
the model with the best fit is likely to 
result in poor predictions.” Armstrong 
(2012) further adds:
“Analysts assume that models with a bet-
ter fit provide more accurate forecast. This 
ignores the research showing that fit bears 
little relationship to ex ante forecast accu-
racy. Typically, fit improves as complexity 
increases, while ex ante forecast accuracy 
decreases.” (p. 691)
The lesson here is that even random 
datasets can result in seemingly good 
models and the challenge is a move 
toward reporting predictive validity 
instead of fit validity only. Furthermore, 
R is a measure of linear relationship 
only; therefore, there may be an exact 
connection between two variables but 
if it is not a straight line, R is no help. 
Armstrong (2012) thus warns of how 
misleading t, p-value, F, and R-Squares 
can be and also suggests not using more 
than three variables in a regression 
model, as most are linearly dependent 
on each other and thus lead to spu-
rious results. This rule of thumb has 
also be advocated by Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer (2009). There is an on-going 
discussion in the social science and 
strategic management literature about 
the inappropriate use of statistical 
constructs such as p-values and the 
null hypothesis (Bettis, Ethiraj, Gam-
bardella, Helfat, & Mitchell, 2016). This 
connects well with the arguments estab-
lished above.
Illusion of Causality
Several studies have attempted to iden-
tify the ‘root causes’ of cost overruns, 
but invariably only end up scratching 
the surface of this complicated problem 
using statistical measures of correlation 
between variables (e.g., Mansfield et al., 
1994; Ubani, Okoroch, & Emeribe, 2013; 
Rosenfeld, 2014). However, identifying 
correlations between factors does not 
mean they are causes. For example, the 
fact that high ‘graffiti’ (Skogan, 1990) 
and ‘broken window’ neighborhoods 
(Wilson & Kellig, 1982) correlate rather 
strongly with high crime levels does not 
mean that graffiti or broken windows 
cause the crimes.
A correlation provides circumstan-
tial evidence implying a causal link, but 
the weight of such depends greatly on 
the particular circumstances involved. 
However, a number of studies rely solely 
on establishing a correlation between 
several factors and a project’s cost over-
run. These studies are usually correla-
tional in nature and symmetric, thus 
positing that the presence of a given 
plausible causal condition will lead to 
the occurrence of the outcome. Implic-
itly, they also assume causal asymme-
try, that the absence of a given cause 
or set of causal conditions thought to 
be associated with the outcome will 
result in the absence of the outcome. 
It is argued that this symmetry needs 
not be so, and that there can be several 
possible causal paths for a cost overrun 
(Ragin, 2000). This was demonstrated 
by Love et al. (2008) in their analysis 
of the causal nature of design-induced 
rework that leads to cost overruns on 
construction projects. The argument 
also follows that a variable with a weak 
correlation coefficient can combine 
with another to result in a very high 
impact on a project’s performance. To 
fully understand cost overrun causa-
tion, the emphasis should thus move 
from independent, single-cause identi-
fication and traditional net-effect cor-
relational analysis to look for plausible 
causal combinations, or recipes, that 
can be associated with the occurrence 
of overrun (Ragin, 2000).
Ubani et al. (2013), for example, set 
out to investigate factors that cause cost 
and schedule overruns in Nigeria and 
developed a questionnaire based on 
“110 hypothetical cost overrun” factors 
derived from the literature. The returned 
questionnaires from respondents were 
then analyzed by measuring the RI and 
correlation coefficients. They found 
that material-related issues, including 
price fluctuation and shortages were the 
main causes of overrun. They rejected 
the hypothesis that contractual rela-
tionships, labor, and design had any 
significant influence on cost overrun. 
They then recommended that clients, 
contractors, and consultants “should 
pay more attention to both material and 
external factors for there to be effec-
tive and efficient delivery on construc-
tion projects at the right time and cost” 
(p.73). It is obvious that the framing and 
design of the research led to the super-
ficial findings, such as material shortage 
being the main cause of overrun. Also, it 
is perhaps unlikely that valid causation 
can be adequately demonstrated using 
the research formulation above.
Ambiguous and Superficial Factors
Poor project management, lack of coor-
dination between parties, mistakes dur-
ing construction, and slow information 
flow between parties are some of the 
factors used in the survey by Memon 
et al. (2012). Other factors, including 
inadequate control procedures, slow 
decision making, waiting for informa-
tion or poor documentation, as used 
in Frimpong, Oluwoye, and Crawford 
(2003), are rather too ambiguous. They 
could easily be misinterpreted by the 
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respondents, particularly if they are all 
not thinking within the context of a par-
ticular project or situation. They may 
also evoke countless possible scenarios 
and examples depending on the con-
text, thus giving an indication that such 
factors are rather too superficial and 
therefore must be broken down further 
if real sources of overrun are to be iden-
tified. Questionnaires may be a quick 
and easy way of sampling the views of 
respondents, but can also be problem-
atic if the researcher’s definition of a 
factor does not correspond with the 
respondent’s understanding.
It also follows that when question-
naire respondents are not thinking 
within the framework of the same or sim-
ilar projects, their frames-of-reference 
can differ significantly. Unless they were 
perhaps used as part of a structured-
case study, for example, it is argued that 
questionnaires alone may not be suit-
able for investigating complex and sys-
temic problems like cost overruns. For 
example, ‘good project management’ or 
‘efficient document management’ will 
mean very different things to respon-
dents. The factors are simply too high 
level to help in getting to the heart of the 
problem itself. Interviews allowing the 
surfacing of deep tacit knowledge and 
also enabling the capture of relation-
ships can provide a much more com-
prehensive and effective representation 
of the situation as demonstrated in the 
works of Ackermann and Eden (2005) 
and Love et al. (2008).
Availability Heuristics
Heuristics are mental shortcuts that 
help people make decisions and judg-
ments quickly without investing a lot 
of time in analyzing information. One 
such heuristic is termed the ‘availability 
heuristic.’ According to Gilovich, Griffin, 
and Kahneman (2002), the availability 
heuristic is employed when someone 
estimates the frequency or probabil-
ity of an event based on the ease with 
which instances or associations could 
be brought to mind. Even though heu-
ristics can be extremely helpful, they can 
easily become a hindrance to deep and 
careful thinking. In their seminal work 
on heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) posited that availability can often 
be affected by various factors, which are 
completely unrelated to the actual fre-
quency or probability of the event under 
review—how busy the respondent is, 
his or her interest in the subject under 
study, level of experience, peculiarities 
of the most salient examples he or she 
can recall, his or her understanding 
of the questions in the survey, or the 
time available to complete a question-
naire. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
thus warn that if availability is applied 
to the analysis of an event, these factors 
“will affect the perceived frequency of 
the classes and the subjective prob-
ability of events; consequently, the use 
of the availability leads to systematic 
biases” (p. 209).
Without carefully designed research 
and an established context of those 
projects being evaluated, results of the 
questionnaires, such as the ones con-
ducted by Ameh et al. (2010), Durdyev 
et al. (2012), and Memon et al. (2012) 
become problematic. Whereas the same 
factors consistently identified from 
questionnaire surveys are poor estima-
tion, poor project management, inad-
equate risk management, unexpected 
ground conditions, scope changes or 
material price changes, there is no 
acknowledgment of systemicity, multi-
plicity of interpretation, or action. It will 
take more thoughtful research design, 
perhaps research conducted within the 
context of a particular project, to be 
able to partly circumvent these default 
responses that have yet to help mitigate 
or contain cost overrun in construction.
Heterogeneous Viewpoints
To further complicate matters, respon-
dents are often drawn from different 
professions within the industry. This 
may seem a prudent approach because 
it helps to investigate the problem 
from different perspectives. However, 
Durdyev et al. (2012) and Memon et al. 
(2012) for example, surveyed clients, 
consultants, and contractors without 
controlling for the different perspectives 
of these professionals. The perceived 
sources or size of overruns reported 
will significantly vary, depending on 
whether the construction professional 
works for a client or for a contracting 
firm. It will be useful to survey these 
groups separately to maintain the integ-
rity of the varying viewpoints. This prob-
lem of context and cross-perspectives 
could at least be partially addressed 
by using structured case studies, as all 
respondents would be reviewing the 
same project(s). Structured case stud-
ies are usually more appropriate when 
an in-depth knowledge of an individ-
ual example is more helpful than fleet-
ing and superficial knowledge about a 
larger number of examples.
Replication
Replication is the performance of another 
study to statistically substantiate, or chal-
lenge, a hypothesis, has significant value 
for research, and therefore has been the 
cornerstone of scientific and social stud-
ies. It is based on a simple concept: 
“trust, but verify.” Where a replicative 
study results in different findings, it may 
indicate that the original hypotheses may 
have been incorrect or only partially cor-
rect, and that an alternative formula-
tion may be able to reconcile apparent 
divergent results. Replication is therefore 
essential to establish or disprove causal 
inferences, determination of generaliz-
ability of findings, and even stimulate 
new research. When carried out in a 
cumulative manner, it can be used to 
build on previous studies and facilitate a 
better understanding of a phenomenon.
For cost overrun research, however, 
replication has largely been a case of 
reinventing the wheel—doing the same 
thing over and over again. Edge (1995) 
aptly describes this sort of research 
as “the mass production of a standard 
product” lacking in “intellectual expan-
sion” of the field. However, expansion 
in the depth and detail of cost overrun 
research must take priority over mere 
quantity and bulk. Having reviewed 
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the normative literature, it was found 
that there has been little methodologi-
cal advancement in most cost over-
run studies. Some of these include 
the studies by Mansfield et al. (1994); 
Kaming, Olomolaiye, Holt, and Harris. 
(1997); Ameh et al. (2010); Enshassi, 
Kumaraswamy, and Al-Najjar (2010); 
Memon et al. (2012); and Durdyev et al. 
(2012). The dominant method used in 
these studies involves mostly compiling 
a long list of supposed ’causes’ of over-
runs in a questionnaire and requiring 
respondents to rank them using their 
perceived frequency or importance. It 
comes at little surprise that Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2002) observed that the sizes of 
overruns have not reduced over the 
70 years since they’ve been studied. 
They also concluded that “no learning 
that would improve cost estimate accu-
racy seems to take place.” That may well 
be partly due to the stagnation in rigor 
and robustness of research dedicated to 
ameliorating the problem.
Making Sense of Cost Overrun 
Causation
Dekker (2014) states that a “cause is not 
something you find. Cause is something 
you construct. How you construct it and 
from what evidence, where you look, 
what you look for, who you talk to, what 
you have seen before, and who you work 
for” (Dekker, 2014). Bearing in mind 
this view, the methods used to con-
struct a cause of a particular problem 
are just as important as the validity and 
usefulness of the findings. Meaning is 
also intrinsically linked to the environ-
ment and context within which actions 
and responses, as well as interactions 
between dynamic parts, take place. The 
phenomenon of cost overrun in projects 
is contextually embedded; that is, why 
and how cannot be fully understood 
if decoupled from the environment of 
their occurrence. Projects are tradi-
tionally seen as unique, with varying 
degrees of embeddedness and depen-
dencies. The argument thus follows that 
to fully understand the causal nature of 
overruns in construction, the context 
and environment of the project have to 
be clearly articulated and the methods 
used for their investigation need careful 
consideration.
Retrospective sensemaking is a 
well-established technique for devel-
oping meaning of complex problems, 
events, and environment (Weick, 1988). 
Thomas, Clark, and Gioia (1993, p. 240) 
defined sensemaking as the three-
pronged process of “reciprocal interac-
tion of information seeking, meaning 
ascription and action” that includes 
environmental influences and associ-
ated responses. Weick, Sutcliffe, and 
Obstfeld (2005) described a number of 
characteristic features of sensemaking—
the process is collective and collab-
orative, designed to be retrospective 
to help a group make meaning of the 
events and circumstances that affect 
them or the causal nature of a par-
ticular problem. The process helps the 
group to begin noticing specific uncer-
tainties and explicitly or implicitly ask 
questions, such as: ‘Why did this event 
happen?’ ‘How does this event relate 
with this other event?’ ‘How are these 
causal factors related?’ The group then 
builds plausible causal narratives and 
related actions often guided by the use 
of mental models and other mapping 
techniques. Cognitive mapping (Eden & 
Ackermann, 1988; Ackermann & Eden, 
2005) and System Dynamics (Forrester, 
1993) are two modeling techniques that 
accommodate systemicity and can be 
utilized under the auspices of retrospec-
tive sensemaking to understand and 
model interdependencies.
Modeling Interdependencies
Cognitive mapping (CM) is a set of 
techniques used to identify, structure, 
analyze, and make sense of accounts 
of problems (Eden, 2004). Swan (1997, 
p. 188) describes cognitive maps as 
“internally represented schemas or 
mental models for particular problem-
solving domains that are learned and 
encoded as a result of an individual’s 
interaction with their environment.” 
These maps, elsewhere known as ‘cause 
maps’ when used to explore causal rela-
tionships (Ackermann & Eden, 2005), 
can be a really effective and interact-
ing way of making sense of messy and 
complex problems particularly when 
they are constructed by a group. The 
general approach involves the use of a 
range of mapping techniques to extract 
statements from individuals or groups 
about subjectively meaningful concepts 
and relationships in particular prob-
lem areas. These concepts and rela-
tionships are then illustrated in some 
kind of diagrammatical representation 
(Swan, 1997).
System Dynamics (SD) is a mod-
eling technique used to help deci-
sion makers learn about the structure 
and dynamics of complex systems, to 
design high leverage policies for sus-
tained improvement, and to catalyze 
successful implementation and change 
(Rodrigues & Bowers, 1996). SD is par-
ticularly suitable for analyzing highly 
dynamic systems that consist of multi-
ple interdependent components involv-
ing several nonlinear relationships, as 
is the case of cost overrun causation on 
construction projects. The totality of 
the relationships between these com-
ponents defines the “structure” of the 
system. Hence, it is said that the “struc-
ture” of the system, operating over time, 
generates its “dynamic behaviour pat-
terns” (Vlachos, Georgiadis, & Iakovou, 
2007). The approach is primarily based 
on cause–effect diagrams to understand 
the causal nature of particular prob-
lems and to model the dynamic nature 
of these causal factors throughout a 
project.
By shifting the focus from simply 
ranking variables and correlational anal-
ysis, researchers including Williams, 
Ackermann, Eden, and Howick (1997), 
Love, Holt, Shen, and Irani (2002), 
Ogunlana, Li, and Sukhera (2003), 
Howick (2005), and Boateng et al. (2015) 
have demonstrated the complexities of 
project actuality, systemicity, and per-
formance. Specifically, Ackermann and 
Eden (2005) also studied the causal 
nature of delays and disruption on 
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eight different projects, with a total 
value in excess of US$2 billion (none 
of the projects had a value less than 
US$60 million).
All of the projects, however, expe-
rienced cost overrun greater than 30% 
and were delivered late. Ackermann 
and Eden (2005) used causal mapping 
with Group Support Systems to elicit an 
understanding of failure occurs in com-
plex projects. Using triangulated data 
from interviews, questionnaires, and 
non-participant observation, Boateng 
et al. (2015) identified different eco-
nomic risk factors on the Edinburgh 
Tram Project in Scotland. These factors 
include increases in foreign exchange 
and inflation, change in government, 
disputes, change in tax regime, and 
energy price increases. These factors 
were then modeled using SD to reveal 
their interdependences and the causal 
nature of the significant time and cost 
overruns experienced on the project. 
Bayer and Gann (2006) explored bid-
ding strategies and workload dynam-
ics within project-based organizations 
using system dynamics to provide 
insight into how these relate to produc-
tivity, rework, and cost overrun within 
project portfolios. They described the 
‘phenomenon of error amplification,’ 
in which overruns on one project led to 
further overruns in other projects within 
the same portfolio—rework and conse-
quent overruns generated in individual 
projects bind the resources required for 
the successful and timely completion of 
other projects.
System dynamics and causal 
mapping have also been effectively 
combined by Howick, Ackermann, 
and Andersen (2006) to allow client 
groups to visualize and comprehend 
the linkage between event thinking 
and structural thinking in a complex 
system as they provide a meaningful 
way to both deal with interdependency 
of different causal variables and how 
they evolve over time. Studies of this 
nature are essential building blocks for 
understanding cost overrun causation 
and theory development and will pave 
the way for designing more effective 
ameliorating strategies. Unfortunately, 
studies of this kind are few and far 
between in the current cost overrun 
literature.
Conclusions
We have explored some of the method-
ological deficiencies in the approaches 
adopted in a majority of the cost over-
run research. These deficiencies include 
a poor understanding of systemicity 
and embeddedness of the sources of 
overruns, a dependence on correla-
tional analysis, a lack of demonstra-
ble causality, and superficiality of the 
research design. We found that cost 
overrun research has largely stagnated 
in the refinement and advancement of 
the knowledge area—the bulk of it has 
largely been replicative. We would par-
ticularly like to highlight the lack of 
systems approach in cost overrun stud-
ies, which invariably leads to the iden-
tification of independent, single-cause 
variables justified in using traditional 
deterministic net-effect correlational 
analysis.
We submit that this approach  is a 
flawed simplification of the cost overrun 
problem and may be counterproduc-
tive. It is suggested that a significant 
paradigm and methodological shift 
may be required to properly under-
stand the nature and sources of cost 
overruns. Overrun causation can only 
be understood by looking at the whole 
project system in which it occurs 
and how several variables dynami-
cally interact with each other. It may 
be important to reiterate here that 
the crucial skill in understanding cost 
overrun is not the ability to list or rank 
factors but the capacity to analyze con-
nections, interactions, and plausible 
causal combinations.
Finally, this article is not intended 
to discredit previous works, rather map 
out future directions for cost overrun 
research. It is simply an attempt to look 
back, so that we might be able to look 
forward. This is perhaps particularly 
important, and timely, especially against 
the backdrop of overwhelming evidence 
that cost overrun is as much a problem 
today as it was decades ago. Further-
more, what is the benefit of doing the 
same thing over and over again if it is 
not yielding transformative results?
The case for accommodating multiple-
conjunctural causation, in which many 
causes/variables combine to produce sev-
eral causal recipes, each of which may be 
sufficient to result in the outcome, has 
already been made in this article. This 
perspective is anchored in the organiza-
tional theories that a system can reach the 
same final state from different initial condi-
tions, and by a variety of different paths. It 
is suggested that future research should 
focus on examining cost overrun causation 
using probabilistic approaches and system 
dynamics to address the interdependence 
and high-level interactions between mul-
tiple factors.
The central idea behind probabilis-
tic theories of causation is that causes 
change the probability of their effects, 
so that an effect may still occur in the 
absence of a cause or failure to occur 
in its presence. This approach recog-
nizes the centrality of probabilities in 
project outturns and will represent a 
move from independent, single-cause 
identification and traditional net-effect 
correlational analysis to look for plau-
sible causal combinations, or causal 
recipes, that can be associated with the 
occurrence of overrun. These causal 
combinations can be graphically illus-
trated using the causal mapping tech-
niques described in earlier sections of 
the article. The outputs and publica-
tions from the ongoing study will thus 
help in new theory development regard-
ing the causal nature of overruns in 
infrastructure projects.
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